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Abstract
We advance the literature on political budget cycles by testing separately for
cycles in expenditures for elections in the legislative and the executive. Using
municipal data, we can separately identify these cycles and account for general
year effects. For the executive branch, we show that it is important whether the
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1. Introduction
Originating with Nordhaus (1975), a main paradigm of the political economics literature is
that political agents act rational when deliberately manipulating the economy or particular
fiscal aggregates to gain an electoral advantage. Further theory (e.g., Rogoff and Sibert,
1988 and Rogoff, 1990) has confirmed the main prediction of this paradigm even under ra-
tional expectations of the voters.1 While the early empirical literature looked for cycles in
macroeconomic aggregates such as unemployment and inflation2, more recent work high-
lighted credible evidence for political budget cycles (henceforth, PBC) in fiscal aggregates
such as debt, expenditures, and its composition (see Keech and Pak, 1989, Alesina et al.,
1997, or Brender and Drazen, 2005).3 Overall, the phenomenon of PBC is relatively well
understood and the empirical evidence is highlighting the relevance in actual policy making.
This paper aims to contribute to this literature in two ways. First, we study PBCs in
expenditures for elections in the legislative and the executive. The existing literature mostly
had to focus on the legislative branch or on joint elections. Our data and institutional design
provides us with the unique opportunity to study the cycles of the two institutions separately
and evaluate the effects of overlaps. Second, for the analysis of PBCs in the executive, we
highlight the concerns related to the endogenous decision of incumbent executives to re-
run. Overcoming this endogeneity is crucial as we expect PBCs only when the incumbent
competes for re-election. Here, we use an instrumental variables approach based on the age
of the incumbent as well as on pension eligibility rules to achieve credible identification. To
the best of our knowledge, both innovations have not been treated in the literature.
The testing ground for our analysis is the German municipal level. Our paper is therefore
related to the literature that focuses on the sub-national level. In Table A.1 in the appendix,
we provide a detailed and exhaustive overview of papers studying PBCs in expenditures at
the sub-national level which relate directly to our first contribution. Evidence for cycles in
expenditures has been documented on state, regional and municipal level in twelve different
countries. Most studies focus on legislative elections and use variation over time to separate
election effects from general year effects.4 Apart from the papers in Table A.1, we identified
1 Alternatively, Persson and Tabellini (2000), and Shi and Svensson (2006) provide a theoretical foundation
for political budget cycles under rational expectations and moral hazard. Also, a second strand of
theoretical work relates to partisan cycles (e.g., Hibbs, 1977; Alesina, 1987, 1988a) which explains electoral
cycles by shifts in political ideology.
2 Studies finding only weak or no evidence for cycles in real macroeconomic aggregates include, among
others, Lächler (1978), Golden and Poterba (1980) and Alesina et al. (1997).
3 Further evidence at the national level is provided by Alesina (1988b), Alesina et al. (1992), Schuknecht
(1999), Potrafke (2012), and Klomp and De Haan (2013).
4 Note that the literature here is divided into papers that study the size of aggregate expenditures close
to elections (similar to our question) and several authors testing for PBCs in the composition of ex-
penditures. Evidence for the latter case was first presented by Blais and Nadeau (1992) and Kneebone
and Mckenzie (2001) for Canada and later by Drazen and Eslava (2010), Veiga and Veiga (2007b) and
Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) in the case of municipal or regional legislative elections in Colombia,
Portugal and Russia respectively. Common to all their results is a shift in expenditures especially to
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three studies that are of particular importance for us. Using alternative outcome variables
and focusing on council elections in Germany, Foremny and Riedel (2014) (taxes), Englmaier
and Stowasser (2013) (saving banks lending) and Mechtel and Potrafke (2013) (unemploy-
ment) provide evidence that PBCs are of large significance in Germany.5 Furthermore, in a
recent working paper, Furdas et al. (2014) analyse a related question of how PBCs evolve
in different federal tiers.
For the second part of the paper, the related literature is comparatively small. Only few
papers have looked at PBCs in the executive branch (e.g., Rose, 2006; Alt and Rose, 2009).
The reason is that the executive is often not elected directly by the voter. And even if
separate elections are held, the timing of those elections often coincides with the legislative.
The two papers that are closest to our approach are by Rosenberg (1992) for Israel and Aidt
et al. (2011) for Portugal. Both papers study combined municipal elections and control
directly for whether the incumbent executive re-runs in the election.6 Our contribution here
is that we treat the endogeneity of the incumbent’s decision to re-run with an instrumental
variables approach.
The particular data that we use come from German municipalities in the states of Bavaria
and Baden-Württemberg (henceforth BAY and BW respectively) covering the period be-
tween 1992-2006. To our advantage, the two states are comparable in many dimensions.
Both have had direct mayoral elections for a long time, use a comparable constitutional
design governing the affairs of local municipalities and are comparable in population size
as well as economic performance. For both states, we observe expenditures for the en-
tire universe of municipalities throughout the sample period. Complementing the spending
data, we collected data on elections (mayoral and council elections), other fiscal measures
(state transfers) and important socio-economic characteristics (population, municipal age
structure, ideological indicators for councils and mayors). For BAY, we indeed have full
information on the entire set of variables. In BW, all information is available except for the
mayoral elections data which we had to survey town by town (see section 3).
Crucial for the validity of our empirical analysis is the fact that state law regulates election
cycles and that election dates are therefore set exogenous with very little or virtually no
influence on the timing by municipalities.7 The council elections in BAY and in BW are held
categories with high visibility for the electorate.
5 Earlier studies for Germany involve Seitz (2000), Galli and Rossi (2002) as well as Schneider (2010) and
test for PBCs in total expenditure and deficits. Rather than on the municipal-level, as it is the case in
our analysis, these studies rely on state-level data and elections.
6 There is also some indirect evidence that expenditure manipulation may indeed be a good strategy for
an incumbent. Freier (2011) provides evidence that the voters reward incumbent mayors that succeeded
in raising the level of expenditures prior to election, but at the same time fail to punish the running
mayor for increases in debt. Veiga and Veiga (2007a) confirm this pattern using Portuguese data.
7 In case of council elections, individual municipalities in BAY or BW have no influence whatsoever. In
case of mayoral elections, exceptions are given by cases in which the town council may recall the mayor
and thereby in principle can manipulate the timing of elections. This, however, only occurred in a
negligible number of towns, see Kern (2008). The term of the mayor may also end prematurely due to
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on state-specific dates which are identical for all municipalities in the respective state. In
contrast, regulations with respect to mayoral elections differ between states. While election
dates for the executive branch in BAY are aligned with council elections, BW exhibits
municipal-specific dates which differ from dates of council elections (see section 4). Given
this institutional structure of election dates, we can identify PBC both in mayoral as well
as in council elections and separate those effects from general year effects.
Our main results are threefold. First, we identify sizable and significant increases in total
expenditures in pre-election years for the legislative branch. These results are in the range
of 1.3–1.8 percent of total expenditures and remain stable through all our robustness tests.
For a middle-sized town of 10,000 inhabitants, this amounts to additional spending in the
order of about 300,000 Euro in the year prior to the election. Second, we find that these
fiscal cycles in council elections are unaffected by the timing of mayoral elections. Third,
we show that there is an effect of overlapping cycles conditional on the incumbent’s decision
to re-run for office. Municipal expenditures increase in joint pre-election and election years
if the incumbent mayor seeks for re-election and increase in joint post-election years if the
mayor did not re-run. For instance, given that the incumbent mayor enters the race for
office again, municipal spending in overlapping pre-election years is 5.5 percent higher than
in the counterfactual situation when the incumbent mayor does not seek re-election.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional setting, whereas
section 3 presents our data and descriptives. In section 4 we lay out the empirical strategy,
section 5 discusses the main results and section 6 presents the sensitivity analyses. Section
7 concludes.
2. Institutional background
The municipal level in Germany is the lowest of three governmental tiers.8 Within this
structure, the municipalities are responsible for a significant share of the overall state activ-
ity.9 Among other things, municipalities are responsible for general administration, public
order, cultural expenditures, infrastructure and public transport. Also, towns often oversee
local public firms and administrate expenditures from higher-level tiers (e.g., expenditures
on social welfare). Despite the often complex division of tasks between the different tiers,
the municipalities (especially in BAY and BW) retain considerable discretion in spending
decisions.
death or sickness (arguably exogenous) or resignation (potentially endogenous). We discuss these issues
in more detail in section 4.
8 Besides the federal level, there exist 16 federal states and about 12,500 municipalities (organized in about
450 counties).
9 Municipalities in BW sign responsible for 52.9% of all expenditures in the state which is above the
German average (this includes municipal budgets as well as state-own companies under the control of
the local towns). Municipalities in BAY administrate 49.7% (see Federal Statistical Office, 2011).
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Municipalities in Germany are governed by an elected council and an elected mayor.
Councils act as the legislative body of the local town or municipality and mayors can be
viewed as the executive branch.10 While councils are elected in open list proportional elec-
tions, majoritarian elections are held to determine the race for the local mayor.11 In BAY,
the council and the mayor are elected for six years on (generally) the same statewide elec-
tion day.12 In contrast to this, election terms of mayors and councils in BW are of different
length and election days differ accordingly: the local mayor is elected for eight years, while
council elections are held every five years. Furthermore, only the council elections are held
on the same statewide day, whereas the election dates for mayors are municipality specific,
i.e., each municipality has its own electoral cycle for mayoral elections.
We illustrate the distribution of mayoral and council elections over time in Figure 1.
Within the time coverage of this study, we observe council elections held in 1996 and 2002
in BAY and in 1994, 1999, and 2004 in case of BW. In BAY, mayoral elections generally
run parallel with council elections. However, some mayoral election cycles deviate from the
general rule due to prematurely ended terms. This is the case for 689 mayoral elections (16%
in relation to 4114 council elections). In contrast, mayoral elections in BW spread evenly
throughout the years and only randomly overlap with council elections (15% in relation to
3303 council elections).13
Crucial for the validity of our empirical analysis is the fact that the timing of local elections
(council as well as mayoral) is regulated by state law and is for the most part outside of the
control of the individual municipality. The timing of the council elections is fixed entirely
by given state-wide election terms and is therefore exogenous.14 While in principle this is
also true for mayoral elections, the mayor’s term may potentially deviate from these general
rules. In particular, the mayor’s term may end prematurely and necessitates new elections
10 Note that the local mayor is also a voting member of the council. Generally, the mayor is in charge of the
administration, she prepares all decisions of the municipalities and oversees the implementation. Also,
she is often the only full-time working politician in the town.
11 The electoral rules in BAY and BW are quite similar. There are, however, also subtle differences. For
council elections, both states have open-list proportional elections where voters have as many votes as
there are seats in the council (which allows for vote-splitting and cross-voting). There exist no explicit
hurdles for small parties. BW uses a Sainte-Lague and BAY (a two-step) D’Hondt seat allocation
mechanism. For mayoral elections, both states use a two-round majoritarian procedure. If no candidate
obtains the absolute majority in the first round, a second election must be held. In BAY, this second
election is a classical run-up election between the two leading candidates. In BW, the second election is
open (even new candidates are allowed) and first-past-the-post.
12 There are exceptions to that rule, when mayor election terms ended prematurely. In this case, a Bavarian
municipality might have an independent mayoral election for one term with the requirement to align with
the state-wide election dates again in the second subsequent election.
13 Note that these deviations remain if we restrict the calculations to those municipal-year observations
that are included in our estimations, i.e., mayoral and council election years in BW randomly overlap in
14.7%, while mayoral election years in BAY deviate from council election years in 10.7% in relation to
the number of council elections.
14 There is no option for pre-mature elections for the council. As there are no formal coalition agreements,
it cannot happen that a government breaks down. Also, if, a council member dies in office or resigns due
to personal reasons, she is automatically replaced by a successor.
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Figure 1: Number of council and mayoral elections in BAY and BW
due to a number of reasons. First, the citizens or the council may recall the mayor.15 Second,
the mayor may die or resign for personal (e.g., sickness) or political reasons (lack of political
support). A third reason causing deviations from the predefined length of political terms is
given by existence of strict age limits inhibiting incumbents to serve beyond the age of 68
in case of BW.16
Focusing on BAY and BW in a sub-national study on PBC is attractive due to several
reasons. First, historically, both states have had direct mayoral elections already since
World War II. This stands in contrast to all other German states which introduced direct
mayoral elections starting in the mid-1990s (see Ade and Freier, 2013). As a consequence, we
cannot study individual PBCs in mayoral and council elections in other states earlier than
the 2000s.17 Furthermore, since the mayor is automatically a voting member of the council
in both states, studying the overlap of individual cycles is interesting, as the institutional
setting may leave room for collusion between both political branches.
Second, the constitutional framework that governs the affairs of the local level follows a
comparable standard in BAY and BW. Both states apply a constitutional setting that is
referred to as Süddeutsche Ratsverfassung. Important for our study, this particular consti-
tutional setting grants extensive rights and duties to the position of the mayor. Again, this
partly stands in contrast to the institutional structure in other German states, in particular
when it comes to expenditures.
Third, the two states in our analysis are comparable along many other dimensions. Both
are located in direct vicinity in the South of Germany. Given the time coverage of this
study, both states have had conservative state rule throughout.18 Also, both states are of
15 While this option is a constitutionally guaranteed right of the citizens and the council, we almost never
observe this in the time period covered in this study.
16 We further discuss the importance of premature mayoral elections in our section on identification (see
section 4).
17 And even then, evidence from those other German states would be particular as these mayoral elections
are only newly introduced.
18 BAY have had absolute majorities of the conservative party throughout the time coverage of this study.
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comparable size and population.19 Finally, BAY and BW are of comparable wealth and
industrial performance.20 In both states, the municipalities are financially well off, the level
of debt is comparatively low and the towns enjoy extensive financial liberties.21
3. Data
We use data from municipalities in BAY and BW for the period from 1992 to 2006.22 We
observe 2,056 municipalities and a population of 12.5 million inhabitants in BAY and 10.5
million inhabitants live in 1,101 municipalities in BW.
We obtained information on our outcome variable total expenditures, state transfers,
results for the council elections, information on local population as well as population struc-
ture from the respective state statistical offices. We calculate municipal expenditures net of
transfers, i.e., we subtract the amount of transfers from the respective state government from
gross expenditures. This is crucial in order to capture and isolate the discretionary amount
of spending by municipalities and to get rid of confounding influences such as spending which
is initiated by an upper level governmental tier and is only administered at the municipal
level. Beyond that, this transformation helps us to abstract from PBCs in the state level
elections, which potentially could otherwise alter municipal budgets through transfers (see
Furdas et al., 2014).
From the data for the council elections, we create dummy variables that identify a council
pre-election, election or post-election year to capture the legislative PBC. Furthermore, we
classify councils by the share of left parties (party members of the social democrats (SPD)
and the green party (Grüne)). We summarise all relevant descriptive information in Table
1. We further explain our variable coding in Table A.2 in the appendix.
In BW, the conservative party also headed the state government, however, they did so as the predominant
party in a coalition.
19 As a consequence, also the municipal structure is quite comparable. While BW has slightly larger
municipalities on average, these differences are rather small compared to structures in other German
states. Together, the two states account for more than 25% of the German population.
20 Together they account for approximately 75% of the total state redistribution in the German fiscal
equalization scheme (see Heinemann et al., 2013).
21 Municipalities in other German states might have very limited financial opportunities for extraordinary
investment projects or other general pork barrel spending before elections.
22 The time coverage of this study is limited by the availability of data on municipal spending (Jahresrech-
nungsstatistik). Also, data for earlier mayoral elections in BW is hard to obtain.
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In Table A.3 in the appendix, we highlight municipal characteristics of the final sample
for BW for which we ultimately obtained adequate information on mayoral elections and
compare these characteristics with information on the counterfactual full universe. Com-
pared to the total number of 1,101 municipalities and 16,515 municipal-year observations,
the estimation sample comprises only 968 municipalities and significantly less years (10,531
municipal-year observations). Especially small municipalities are lost due to missing infor-
mation on mayoral elections.23 This is plausible given our research strategy that was based
on a questionnaire which smaller municipalities with less municipal staff might not be able
to answer. However, we argue that our results do not suffer from a bias given the small
differences in the variable means between the two groups.
Obtaining comprehensive data on mayoral elections in BW is a challenging task. While
complete administrative data on elections is provided for BAY by the state statistical office,
such data do not exist for BW.24 Due to this lack of official data, we collected data manually
by contacting and surveying all 1,101 municipalities with respect to the dates of past mayoral
elections. Using obtained responses, we then searched regional newspapers as well as official
announcements (Staatsanzeiger Baden-Württemberg) to identify further information on the
specific election, e.g., the name, age, party affiliation and regular occupation of the elected
mayor as well as information on whether the mayor has ran for re-election. Finally, we
conducted an intensive internet search on official websites and free internet resources to fill
further gaps in our data set.
Similar to council elections, we code a set of dummy variables for mayoral elections indi-
cating the pre-election, election and post-election year in each municipality. Furthermore,
we construct dummy variables for mayors indicating a membership of a left-wing party
(member of the social democrats (SPD) or the green party (Grüne)), whether the mayor
has a full-time position and whether the incumbent mayor re-runs for office in the current
election. As the incentives to strategically manipulate public spending should especially be
higher in case of the latter, we will construct respective interactions in order to capture
the impact on the formation of PBCs. Finally, we include the mayor’s age as a further
control variable in our regressions which will also be relevant against the background of our
instrumental variables approach.
As mentioned above, mayoral cycles may end prematurely due to resignation or death of
the mayor. As this may potentially pose problems for the identification of electoral cycles, we
exclude non-completed or prematurely ended political terms from our baseline specification.
When testing the robustness of our main results, we also run estimations in which we include
23 The p-values of the mean comparison t-test further show that the difference in the means is statistically
significant, i.e., we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the means of the control
variables.
24 We contacted all major authorities such as the state statistical office, the association of municipalities,
the state ministry of interior affairs and the state election office. No summary of official data exists for
mayoral elections in BW.
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all available observations including non-completed terms.
4. Identification
We use the following baseline model to identify political budget cycles in expenditures:
log(Yi,t) = t′ci,tδ + t′mi,tφ+ Ii,tθ +
1∑
k=−1
(tci,t+k × tmi,t+k)βk+2 +
1∑
k=−1
(tmi,t+k × Ii,t)τk+2
+
1∑
k=−1
(tci,t+k × Ii,t)pik+2 +
1∑
k=−1
(tci,t+k × tmi,t+k × Ii,t)σk+2 +X′i,tγ
+ λt + µi + h(t, s) + i,t.
(1)
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of municipal total expenditures, net of
transfers, Yi,t. The vectors t′c and t′m contain dummies capturing election dates in council
(c) and mayoral (m) elections, respectively. In particular, we define these dummies for
respective elections j = c,m as
t′j =

tjt−1
tjt
tjt+1
 and

=1 in the pre-election year, 0 otherwise
=1 in the election year, 0 otherwise
=1 in the post-election year, 0 otherwise.
(2)
To test for differences in spending if cycles overlap, we estimate interaction terms for
congruent pre-, post-, and election years as in Foremny and Riedel (2014). The dummy
variable Ii,t denotes whether the incumbent mayor re-runs for office at the next election.
The indicator is set to zero/one for the whole election period, i.e., we assume that the
mayor already knows whether she will re-run for office at the end of her term when she
takes office.25 As a result, the estimation coefficient of the incumbent indicator only reveals
spending differences between electoral periods. The estimation of interaction terms with the
mayoral election dummies then allows separating general from specific incumbent effects
in times of elections. Finally, the triple interactions capture effects of overlapping cycles
conditional on the incumbent’s decision to re-run for office.
We include general year (λt) and municipality (µi) fixed effects into the model and allow
for state-specific linear and quadratic time trends which we denote by h(t, s). Additional
control variables are denoted by X′i,t and include population and population squared to
control for non-linear effects of local population size, population structure indicators, state
25 We assume that the mayor, at least, has some preferences about this decision which lead to the final
decision at the end of her term. Note that, without this assumption, we would condition the incum-
bent dummy on election years which would render separating general from specific incumbent effects
unfeasible.
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election indicators, ideological proxies for both the mayor and the council, the age of the
mayor and a dummy variable indicating whether the mayor is a full-time politician.
It is important to highlight again how our estimation specification identifies PBCs in
council and mayoral elections. As council elections in BAY and BW are held in different
years, the effects of council cycles can be separated from general year effects and from
state-specific time trends. In contrast, the identification for the mayoral elections is more
involved. As highlighted in section 2, mayoral elections in BAY are generally held at the
same time as council elections with few exceptions. In BW, however, we observe mayoral
elections across all years which are independent from council elections. This is the source
of variation, including overlapping as well as non-overlapping elections, we exploit in order
to identify individual mayoral election cycles.
A further important condition for the identification of cycles is the exogeneity of election
dates. In case of council elections, terms are entirely predetermined by state regulation
and cannot be influenced by individual municipalities. While for mayoral elections this is
generally true as well, the municipality (and/or the mayor) may influence the timing of
elections within limits. In particular, the term of the mayor may end prematurely when 1)
the citizens or the council recall a mayor (which is an extremely rare event), 2) the mayor
dies or resigns due to sickness (arguably exogenous to our application) or 3) the mayor
resigns for other reasons (personal or political reasons).26 In our baseline specification, we
therefore decided to rely exclusively on fully completed mayoral election terms. This ensures
that election dates are exogenous and predetermined by state regulation only (eight years in
BW and six years in BAY). In the robustness section, we test the sensitivity of our results
by including terms that ended prematurely. The results remain similar both in terms of size
and significance.
Another issue that might be raised with respect to endogeneity is given by the incum-
bent’s decision to re-run for office. In particular, if this decision is directly linked to the
fiscal conditions of the municipality and the availability of sufficient financial means for
strategic spending, estimates could not be interpreted as causal. For instance, if a fiscal
shock hits the municipality shortly before an election absorbing available financial means
initially intended for strategic spending and ultimately inducing the incumbent not to seek
re-election, we would falsely attribute pre-election variation in spending to mayoral cycles
in cases of incumbents not re-running for office.27 To deal with this potential endogeneity
formally, we follow an instrumental variables approach.
26 It is clear that a mayor will not return to office if the term ends prematurely due to early resignation. One
main reason for resignations in our data is given by mayors taking office in a larger city involving a higher
remuneration. While the decision to run for office in another municipality is potentially endogenous, the
timing is again exogenous as it is predetermined by the timing of elections in other towns.
27 Note that a potential incompetency of the mayor would not cause such a pattern. This is the case as
incompetency might influence the municipal fiscal position negatively throughout the whole term and is
not necessarily attributed to the years around an election.
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To this end, we use two different instruments (explained below) to account for the potential
endogeneity of the incumbent indicator. However, implementing an instrumental variables
approach in the context of our estimation specification (see equation (1)) is associated with
increased complexity because the incumbent variable is used both as individual as well
as interaction variable. This results in the fact that separate first-stage regressions are
necessary to instrument for the single variable and the interaction terms. The procedure
is exemplary shown in Equations (3.1) to (4) for the interaction of the incumbent dummy
and the mayoral election dummies. In a first step, we separately regress the incumbent
dummy (equation (3.1)) and its interactions with the mayoral election dummies (equation
(3.2)) on the set of instruments, i.e., the single instruments Zi,t, their interactions with the
mayoral election dummies (t′mi,t × Zi,t), and the full set of the remaining covariates C′i,t. In
a second step, we use the predicted values for the incumbent indicator and its interactions
as regressors in the second stage regression (equation (4), see Angrist and Pischke (2009, p.
190ff) and Wooldridge (2010, p. 267f) for more information).28
Ii,t = t′ci,tα1 + t′mi,tα2 + Zi,tα3 + (t′mi,t × Zi,t)α4 +C′i,tα5 + ξi,t (3.1)
(t′mi,t × Ii,t) ≡ TIi,t = t′ci,tκ1 + t′mi,tκ2 + Zi,tκ3 + (t′mi,t × Zi,t)κ4 +C′i,tκ5 + ςi,t (3.2)
log(Yi,t) = t′ci,tδ + t′mi,tφ+ Îi,tθ + T̂Ii,tpi +X′i,tγ + λt + µi + h(t, s) + i,t (4)
Fortunately, the institutional design allows us to construct a set of instruments to get
consistent estimates, as they are uncorrelated with the error term of equation (1), but highly
correlated with the mayor’s decision to re-run for office. We use the following variables and
their interactions with the election dummies to instrument the incumbent indicator, all of
which we derived from a careful exploitation of the features of the municipal electoral law:29
First, we create a dummy variable which is set to one if the mayor is eligible to receive
pensions (dummy mayor is pensionable). In both states, in general, the mayor is only eligible
to receive pensions if she has served as a temporary civil servant for a particular number of
years and has completed at least one entire electoral term.30
28 One might falsely consider to estimate the first stage regression exclusively for the single instrument and
the incumbent dummy and subsequently compute the interaction term for the second stage regression
manually by using the predicted values of the incumbent indicator. This procedure, however, will produce
inconsistent estimates. The results of the first stage regression for the incumbent dummy is presented in
Table A.5 in the appendix. The results of the remaining first stage regressions for the interaction terms
are available upon request. C′i,t ≡ X′i,t + λt + µi + h(t, s).
29 Again, as for the incumbent runs again dummy variable, both indicators are equal to zero/one for the
whole election period.
30 In BAY, the mayor is eligible to receive pensions if she has served for two complete election periods
and was not re-elected at the next election or refused to accept the election. In BW, the ruling is more
complex: The mayor is eligible to receive pensions if she has completed the entire election period and
a) has served for 18 years and is older than 47 years in the year of the election, b) has served for two
electoral terms or c) has served for eight years and is older than 60 years in the year of the election. For
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Second, we create a dummy variable which is equal to one if the mayor is older than
60 years in the year of the mayoral election (dummy mayor is older than 60 years). This
threshold is motivated by the age distribution of incumbent mayors not re-running for office
in the year of election (see Figure 2). There is a significant break in the distribution at the
age of 60 years, i.e., mayors older than 60 years are less likely to seek re-election.
Figure 2: Age distribution for mayors who do not rerun for office in the election year
The two instruments we constructed fulfill both necessary conditions for an instrumental
variables regression: they are relevant in terms of explaining the mayor’s decision to run
for re-election (mayors above the age of 60 years and mayors who are eligible to receive
pensions have less incentives to run for re-election) but are exogenous to local expenditures.
In case of the latter, there is no direct link between pension eligibility and public spending.
With respect to the mayor’s age, in contrast, one might argue that older mayors might
have different preferences shaping their spending behavior. However, we account for this
possibility by directly controlling for the mayor’s age in the regressions. Note that this
indicator is insignificant throughout all specifications (see Table A.4 in the appendix).
5. Results
Tables 2 to 4 present the main results of our estimations. Results of the fixed effects OLS
regression are reported in Table 2, while Table 3 presents the results for the instrumental
variables approach. In both tables, we only show the results for our main variables of
interest (council and mayoral election dummies, the incumbent runs again dummy as well
as the various interaction effects). The results for the control variables are presented in the
further details see Article 21 KWBG (Law on local elections and public servants) (BAY) and §36ff LBG
(Law on state public servants) (BW).
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appendix (see Table A.4).31 As some of our hypotheses are based on interaction terms and
the respective sum of individual coefficients, we refer to Table 4 which presents F-tests of
joint significance for the (combination of) estimated effects and is therefore complementary
to the other two tables.
Tables 2 and 3 are structured in the same way: in columns (1) and (2), we specify
simple PBC models in which we study the council and mayoral election effects separately.
While column (1) shows the results for the council elections, effects of the mayoral elections
are modeled in column (2). In column (3), we combine both cycles and estimate a joint
model. In column (4), we further estimate the interactions between joint council and mayoral
election years and explore effects of overlapping cycles. In column (5), we estimate the
interaction of the incumbent dummy with the mayoral election dummies. Finally, we present
the estimation results of the full model in column (6). Here, we estimate the effects of
overlapping PBCs conditional on the incumbent’s decision to re-run for office.
Council and mayor cycles
We find sizable and statistically significant election effects throughout all specifications only
for the pre-election year in case of council elections. This holds true using the fixed effect
OLS or the instrumental variables approach (see Tables 2 and 3).
The dependent variable is given as logarithm of municipal total expenditures (net of
transfers), the coefficients must thus be interpreted as semi-elasticities. The estimated effect
ranges between 1.3–1.8 percent of total expenditures (except for the result of column (6) in
Table 3). For a town of 10.000 inhabitants this amounts to about 300.000 Euro in additional
expenditures in the year prior to a council election. This pre-election effect for the council
is robust to the inclusion of the mayoral cycle as well the various interaction effects.
For mayoral elections, we do not find evidence for a robust individual cycle in total
expenditures. While we do find evidence for unconditional post-election year cycles in
mayoral elections (column (2) and (3) in Tables 2 and 3), this effect disappears when further
interaction effects are included. Remaining point estimates for the election dummies in case
of mayoral elections are quite small and statistically insignificant.
Overlapping cycles and incumbent effects
We find heterogeneous evidence in case of overlapping cycles (column 4). While neither point
estimates nor F-tests on joint significance point to cycles in cases of pre-election and election
years, post-election years are the exception. Here, municipal expenditures seem to increase
31 Interestingly, neither the ideology proxies nor the full-time mayor dummy and the mayor’s age enter
the model with statistically significant effects. While increasing population has a concave effect on local
expenditures, the shares of young and old people do not affect spending. The estimation results for the
control variables of the instrumental variables regression are available upon request.
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in the year after simultaneous elections in both political branches. The mayor post-election
coefficients are 0.014** (p-value 0.041, fixed effects OLS regression) and 0.015** (p-value
0.035, instrumental variables regression). This points to a potential collusion between both
political branches in order to gain an electoral advantage.
However, the underlying channel though remains unclear in these estimations. We there-
fore extend the model and include information on whether the incumbent mayor seeks re-
election in this municipality in order to explore one potential mechanism behind this result.
Therefore, in columns (5) and (6) of either table we augment the model by interactions of
a dummy including information whether or not the incumbent mayor seeks for re-election
with the cycle variables.
The fact whether the incumbent re-runs for office exhibits a statistically significant and
positive unconditional impact on municipal expenditures in case of the fixed effects OLS
regressions (see Table 2). However, this result is not confirmed by the instrumental variables
approach (Table 3). While point estimates increase in case of the instrumental variables
regression, coefficients become marginally insignificant. Nonetheless, the results indicate
unconditional higher spending in election periods in which the incumbent is seeking re-
election.
To asses the quantitative and qualitative results of columns (5) and (6) in case of multiple
interaction terms, we refer to Table 4 which contrasts the results for both columns in case of
the fixed effects OLS and the instrumental variables regression. Note that Table 4 reports
p-values of underlying F-tests in parantheses. The structure of the table is as follows: while
distinguishing between pre-election, election, and post-election years, we compute marginal
effects for overlapping council and mayoral elections conditional on whether the incumbent
mayor runs for re-election. We then test whether the difference between these effects is
statistically different from zero. Furthermore, we compute the marginal incumbent effect
conditional on whether there is a simultaneous election. This effect can then be contrasted
to the unconditional effects shown in the two baseline tables.
We find a sizable and statistically significant difference in pre-election years for mayors
conditional on whether the incumbent re-runs for office (line Difference D-C ). If the mayor
does not run for re-election, local expenditures decrease in the year before the mayoral
election. In contrast, if the mayor re-runs, the change in expenditures turns positive with a
maximum difference of 5.5 percent (column 4). Furthermore, we find a sizable and significant
incumbent effect in the range of 3.2 – 3.8 percent (line E) if the mayor re-runs conditional
on joint council and mayoral elections in the next year. Note that this effect is much higher
than the unconditional point estimates presented in Tables 2 and 3.
As indicated before, results are heterogeneous with respect to the timing of elections. In
case of election years, we only find a statistically significant difference for the council but
not for mayors. More precisely, if a council election takes place and there is a mayoral
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Table 2: PBCs in public expenditure (fixed effects OLS regression)
Dependent variable: total expenditures in logs (net of transfers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Council elections
Pre-election year 0.015∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.018∗
[2.398] [2.090] [2.141] [2.246] [1.691]
Election year 0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.003
[0.257] [-0.296] [0.037] [-0.251] [-0.268]
Post-election year 0.005 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.007
[0.996] [0.011] [-0.547] [0.088] [-0.672]
Mayor elections
Pre-election year 0.003 0.001 0.002 -0.018∗∗∗ -0.003
[0.876] [0.193] [0.462] [-2.590] [-0.310]
Election year 0.006 0.006 0.007 -0.007 0.009
[1.442] [1.511] [1.310] [-0.865] [0.804]
Post-election year 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.006 -0.005 -0.009
[2.612] [2.420] [1.251] [-0.626] [-0.775]
Mayor elections × council elections
Joint pre-election year -0.005 -0.023
[-0.518] [-1.344]
Joint election year -0.004 -0.022
[-0.452] [-1.370]
Joint post-election year 0.008 0.012
[0.865] [0.775]
Mayor elections × incumbent runs again
Pre-election year 0.024∗∗∗ 0.007
[3.209] [0.627]
Election year 0.017∗ -0.005
[1.763] [-0.344]
Post-election year 0.019∗ 0.020
[1.940] [1.505]
Council elections × incumbent runs again
Pre-election year -0.003
[-0.263]
Election year 0.005
[0.493]
Post-election year 0.005
[0.508]
Joint elections × incumbent runs again
Pre-election years 0.024
[1.301]
Election years 0.025
[1.410]
Post-election years -0.006
[-0.388]
Incumbent runs again dummy 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.004 0.004
[2.940] [3.053] [3.050] [3.043] [0.718] [0.631]
Control variables X X X X X X
Observations 39554 39554 39554 39554 39554 39554
R2 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077
Cluster 3017 3017 3017 3017 3017 3017
Notes: All specifications include municipality and time fixed effects. Robust t-values are shown in brackets. ***, (**),
(*) denotes significance at the 1-, (5-), (10-)%-level. Error terms are clustered on the municipal level. Interaction ef-
fects for election dummies are estimated only for congruent election years. F-Tests for the interaction effects in columns
(5) and (6) are shown in Table 4. The estimation also includes a number of additional control variables, see full list in
Table A.4 in the appendix. Source: Own calculations.
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Table 3: PBCs in public expenditure (instrumental variables regression)
Dependent variable: total expenditures in logs (net of transfers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Council elections
Pre-election year 0.016∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.044∗∗
[2.477] [2.194] [2.266] [2.293] [2.103]
Election year 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.012
[0.282] [-0.140] [0.138] [-0.125] [0.639]
Post-election year 0.005 -0.001 -0.004 -0.000 -0.003
[0.918] [-0.145] [-0.655] [-0.002] [-0.216]
Mayor elections
Pre-election year 0.003 0.000 0.002 -0.017 0.000
[0.786] [0.066] [0.401] [-1.459] [0.017]
Election year 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.036∗
[1.126] [1.129] [0.978] [0.181] [1.726]
Post-election year 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.007 0.033 -0.003
[2.641] [2.475] [1.310] [1.330] [-0.138]
Mayor elections × council elections
Joint pre-election year -0.005 -0.049∗
[-0.568] [-1.650]
Joint election year -0.004 -0.046∗
[-0.375] [-1.854]
Joint post-election year 0.008 0.068∗∗
[0.855] [2.480]
Mayor elections × incumbent runs again
Pre-election year 0.020 0.001
[1.511] [0.065]
Election year 0.002 -0.041
[0.084] [-1.599]
Post-election year -0.033 0.013
[-1.036] [0.491]
Council elections × incumbent runs again
Pre-election year -0.034
[-1.413]
Election year -0.013
[-0.611]
Post-election year -0.001
[-0.042]
Joint elections × incumbent runs again
Pre-election years 0.054
[1.547]
Election years 0.057∗∗
[1.985]
Post-election years -0.080∗∗
[-2.293]
Incumbent runs again dummy 0.015 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.012 0.017
[1.489] [1.635] [1.617] [1.613] [0.791] [1.111]
Control variables X X X X X X
Observations 39344 39344 39344 39344 39344 39344
R2 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.076 0.075
Cluster 2997 2997 2997 2997 2997 2997
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM) 888.7 865.4 864.3 863.4 833.2 674.8
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F) 1066.3 1024.9 1023.0 1021.0 150.4 49.2
Overidentification test (Hansen J p-value) 0.824 0.851 0.850 0.848 0.977 0.755
Notes: The instrumented variable is the incumbent runs again dummy. Instruments are a dummy indicating whether the mayor
is pensionable, a dummy indicating whether the mayor is older than 60 years, and the interactions of the instruments with the
election indicators (if used in the regression, see the results of the first stage regression in Table A.5 in the appendix). All spec-
ifications include municipality and time fixed effects. Robust t-values are shown in brackets. ***, (**), (*) denotes significance
at the 1-, (5-), (10-)%-level. Error terms are clustered on the municipal level. Interaction effects for election dummies are esti-
mated only for congruent election years. F-Tests for the interaction effects in columns (5) and (6) are shown in Table 4. The
estimation includes the full set of additional control variables (the results are available upon request). Source: Own calculations.
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Table 4: Marginal effects of interaction terms: Fixed effects OLS regression vs.
instrumental variables regression
Fixed effects OLS Instrumental variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-election year
A: Council | joint pre-election years, incumbent runs again = 0 -0.005 -0.005
(0.695) (0.814)
B: Council | joint pre-election years, incumbent runs again = 1 0.016 0.015
(0.115) (0.167)
Difference if incumbent reruns (B-A) 0.021 0.020
(0.138) (0.424)
C: Mayor | joint pre-election years, incumbent runs again = 0 -0.018*** -0.026** -0.017 -0.049**
(0.010) (0.034) (0.145) (0.033)
D: Mayor | joint pre-election years, incumbent runs again = 1 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.006
(0.155) (0.559) (0.431) (0.475)
Difference if incumbent reruns (D-C) 0.024*** 0.031** 0.020 0.055**
(0.001) (0.015) (0.131) (0.039)
E: Incumbent runs again | joint pre-election years 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.032* 0.038**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.067) (0.045)
Election year
F: Council | joint election years, incumbent runs again = 0 -0.025* -0.034*
(0.057) (0.063)
G: Council | joint election years, incumbent runs again = 1 0.005 0.010
(0.631) (0.353)
Difference if incumbent reruns (G-F) 0.030** 0.044**
(0.039) (0.047)
H: Mayor | joint election years, incumbent runs again = 0 -0.007 -0.013 0.003 -0.010
(0.387) (0.327) (0.856) (0.683)
I: Mayor | joint election years, incumbent runs again = 1 0.010 0.007 0.005 0.006
(0.032) (0.334) (0.378) (0.463)
Difference if incumbent reruns (H-I) 0.017* 0.020 0.002 0.016
(0.078) (0.150) (0.933) (0.564)
J: Incumbent runs again | joint election years 0.021*** 0.029*** 0.014 0.020
(0.005) (0.002) (0.296) (0.175)
Post-election year
K: Council | joint post-election years, incumbent runs again = 0 0.005 0.065**
(0.698) (0.018)
L: Council | joint post-election years, incumbent runs again = 1 0.004 -0.016
(0.684) (0.202)
Difference if incumbent reruns (L-K) -0.001 -0.081**
(0.906) (0.025)
M: Mayor | joint post-election years, incumbent runs again = 0 -0.005 0.003 0.033 0.065*
(0.531) (0.803) (0.183) (0.051)
N: Mayor | joint post-election years, incumbent runs again = 1 0.014*** 0.017 0.000 -0.002
(0.002) (0.023) (0.991) (0.861)
Difference if incumbent reruns (N-M) 0.019* 0.014 -0.033 -0.067
(0.052) (0.296) (0.300) (0.111)
O: Incumbent runs again | joint post-election years 0.023*** 0.023** -0.021 -0.051
(0.002) (0.015) (0.314) (0.119)
Notes: The marginal effects are computed by using the coefficients of columns (5) and (6) of Table 2 and Table 3, respec-
tively. Two-sided p-values are shown in parantheses. ***, (**), (*) denotes significance at the 1-, (5-), (10-)%-level. Error
terms are clustered on the municipal level. Source: Own calculations.
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election in the same year, expenditures are increased by 4.4 percent if the incumbent seeks
re-election (line Difference G-F, column 4). While the fixed effects OLS regressions again
indicate a significant impact of incumbency, the instrumental variables regressions do not
confirm these results (line J ).
The same pattern for the incumbent effect can be observed in post-election years. Here,
the results from the fixed effects OLS regression are not confirmed by the instrumental vari-
ables approach (line O). A result that is obtained from the instrumental variables approach
though is given by the difference for council elections conditional on the candidacy of incum-
bent mayors (line Difference L-K ). If the mayor did not re-run in the simultaneous elections
which took place in the previous year, expenditures are higher than if the mayor re-ran.
Taken together, municipal expenditures increase in joint pre-election and election years
if the mayor runs for re-election and increase in joint post-election years if she did not. In
case of the first two results, one might argue that these are expected as incentives for strate-
gic spending and collusion with the council are highest if the incumbent seeks re-election.
Furthermore, we observe the pattern that in these settings mayors not re-running for office
usually decrease spending (e.g., line C ). The third main result of a negative difference con-
ditional on the candidacy of the incumbent mayor may be justified with shifts in budget
over time rather than deficit spending. While incentives for strategic spending previous and
contemporary to elections is highest, this may induce shifts of future expenditure to the
present causing a decline in post-election expenditure. The observation of a positive and
statistically significant council effect in post e-election years conditional on the incumbent
not re-running for office (line K ) may be explained by the new mayor colluding with the
council to initiate investment projects promised throughout her election campaign.
6. Robustness checks
We carry out various sensitivity tests to check for the robustness of our findings (see Table
5). First, we include non-completed election periods in the estimation. These periods were
excluded in the previous regressions as the timing of mayoral elections could be endogenous.
Second, we exclude county-free cities from the estimation sample.32 PBCs in these cities
might differ from the full sample because elections are rather partisan than in smaller mu-
nicipalities. Third, to check whether the results are affected by the clustering of the error
terms, we alternatively cluster at the county level. Fourth, we re-estimate all specifica-
tions for data on gross expenditures, i.e., we add state transfers to municipal expenditures.
This may provide further insights into the formation of PBCs as municipal spending may
be co-financed by upper-level governmental tiers. Finally, we estimate our model using a
single instrument rather than two and rely on the dummy indicating whether the mayor is
32 There are 9 county-free cities in BW and 25 county-free cities in BAY.
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older than 60 years in the year of the mayoral election. This is due to the Bavarian state
regulation associated with pension eligibility, i.e., there might be a confounding effect as
one condition to become pensionable in BAY is that the mayor has ran for re-election (but
was not elected or refused to accept her election). Accordingly, a mayor could strategically
decide to re-run in order to become pensionable although it is not her intention to take office
after the election. However, the instrumental variables regression with only one instrument
comes at the cost that we cannot test for overidentification anymore.
The robustness checks are carried out for columns (5) and (6) of Table 3. The results are
reported in Table 5. The letters in italic font at the end of the lines correspond to the letters
in Table 4. Only the main results of the previous findings are presented, i.e., we show the
unconditional coefficient for council pre-election years, the incumbent effect conditional on
joint pre-election years, and the difference in spending if the incumbent re-runs conditional
on joint pre-election, election, and post-election years. The estimates include the full set of
covariates. Again, p-values are shown in parentheses.
The results reveal that the previous findings are highly robust. Both, the economic and
statistical significance of the unconditional council pre-election year effect and the condi-
tional incumbent effect are confirmed. Furthermore, there are only minor changes with
respect to the difference in joint pre-election, election, and post-election years conditional
on whether the incumbent runs for re-election. While the algebraic sign and the point esti-
mates only change slightly, the statistical significance is lost in council election years when we
include non-completed election periods (column (2), line G-F) and in council post-election
years when we carry out the regressions with only one instrument (column (4), line L-K ).
Nonetheless, the main findings of our study still hold. There is an inversion in the ef-
fect for pre-election and election years compared to post-election years conditional on the
incumbent’s decision to re-run. Expenditures are higher in the year before the election and
in the election year if the incumbent runs for re-election and cycles overlap, and are higher
in post-election years if the incumbent did not run for re-election and elections did overlap.
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7. Conclusion
In this paper, we study PBCs in expenditures with a particular focus on overlapping cycles
in the executive and the legislative branch of local governments. As the literature on PBC
usually cannot separate effects for these two political spheres, this is a distinct feature of our
study. Furthermore, we directly account for the potential endogeneity of the incumbent’s
decision to re-run for office and how this decision affects spending in times of elections. The
testing ground is given by German local elections for mayors and municipal councils in the
two southern states of Bavaria (BAY) and Baden-Wuerttemberg (BW). For both states, we
observe the universe of all municipalities during the period from 1992-2006.
Our main findings can be summarised as follows: 1) We find sizable and statistically
significant unconditional pre-election effects for council elections. Total expenditures are
increased between 1.3–1.8 percent in the year before the council election takes place. 2)
These budget cycle effects for the legislative branch (council) are robust to the inclusion of
election variables for the executive branch (mayor). 3) We find no average unconditional
(pre-)election PBC for the mayoral elections. 4) This also holds for the interaction effects
when we condition on whether the incumbent mayor runs for re-election. However, if we
look at differences for the incumbent effect, 5) we find increased spending in pre-election
years if the incumbent re-runs. Finally, 6) we find insightful differences for overlapping cycles
conditional on the incumbent’s decision to re-run for office. Municipal expenditures increase
in joint pre-election and election years if the mayor runs for re-election and decrease in joint
post-election years if she did not. These results are all confirmed by estimations using an
instrumental variables approach for the potentially endogenous decision of the incumbent
to seek re-election.
Our results support the following conclusion: First, joint elections of councils and mayors
seem to matter for the formation of PBCs. Separating the local elections can thus lower
politically motivated distortions of expenditures before elections. Second, our findings for
increased spending before mayoral elections when the incumbent mayor re-runs may justify
age and term limits. In BAY and BW, we have (in)direct age limits but no term limit restric-
tions. Abolishing the age limits would likely increase the number of incumbent candidates
re-running and introducing term limits would act in the opposite direction. Nonetheless,
we would refrain from drawing direct inferences from our results. On the one hand, strong
age and term limit rules could be viewed as limiting overspending before joint mayoral and
council elections. In contrast, however, the mayor’s incentive to manipulate the single elec-
tion where she could be re-elected (for instance, if we assume a two-term limit) should even
increase. It is thus not obvious whether the introduction of term limits would decrease or
increase the overall effect of strategic spending in the long run. This question is thus open
for further research.
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Table A.3: Sample selection comparison for BW
Full Sample Estimation Sample t-test mean comparison
No/Mean S.D. No/Mean S.D. Hypothesis: Difference 6= 0
Number of municipalities 1101 - 968 - -
Municipal-year observations 16515 - 10531 - -
Log total exp. (net of transfers) 15.964 1.182 16.116 1.143 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000
Population (per thousands) 9.481 25.54 10.800 28.19 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0001
Population share < 15 0.182 0.024 0.180 0.024 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000
Population share > 65 0.151 0.029 0.155 0.029 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000
Notes: We test against the null hypothesis that the difference in means is equal to zero, i.e., H0: mean(full sample)
- mean(estimation sample) = 0. The p-values show that the difference is not equal to zero.
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Table A.4: PBCs in public expenditure: Control variables for Table 2
Dependent variable: total expenditures in logs (net of transfers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share left parties in council 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023
[0.571] [0.580] [0.554] [0.554] [0.555] [0.552]
Dummy left mayor -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
[-0.774] [-0.771] [-0.766] [-0.765] [-0.762] [-0.754]
Dummy full time mayor 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
[0.815] [0.797] [0.807] [0.805] [0.809] [0.800]
Age of the mayor 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.700] [0.863] [0.836] [0.840] [0.133] [0.140]
State elections
Pre-election year -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.000
[-0.527] [-1.066] [-0.284] [0.091] [-0.341] [0.048]
Election year 0.011∗∗ 0.003 0.010∗ 0.009∗ 0.010∗ 0.010∗
[2.088] [1.075] [1.799] [1.746] [1.856] [1.854]
Post-election year 0.021∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
[4.028] [7.054] [4.025] [4.324] [3.952] [4.307]
Population 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
[3.377] [3.418] [3.402] [3.409] [3.404] [3.407]
Population squared -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
[-2.993] [-3.037] [-3.029] [-3.037] [-3.014] [-3.029]
Share population < 15 years 0.288 0.293 0.288 0.288 0.290 0.292
[1.156] [1.177] [1.155] [1.158] [1.164] [1.171]
Share population > 65 years 0.131 0.181 0.142 0.151 0.151 0.160
[0.737] [1.096] [0.792] [0.831] [0.842] [0.878]
Trend BAY 0.029∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
[14.338] [9.572] [14.364] [14.358] [14.421] [14.407]
Trend BAY squared -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
[-5.980] [-2.977] [-6.018] [-6.015] [-6.079] [-6.077]
Trend BW 0.036∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
[13.353] [9.853] [13.396] [13.344] [13.352] [13.345]
Trend BW squared -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
[-5.836] [-1.762] [-5.912] [-5.888] [-5.923] [-5.923]
Constant 15.153∗∗∗ 15.141∗∗∗ 15.147∗∗∗ 15.146∗∗∗ 15.165∗∗∗ 15.163∗∗∗
[226.984] [229.019] [225.610] [224.519] [219.643] [218.392]
Observations 39554 39554 39554 39554 39554 39554
R2 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077
Cluster 3017 3017 3017 3017 3017 3017
Notes: All specifications include municipality and time fixed effects. Robust t-values are shown in brackets. ***,
(**), (*) denotes significance at the 1-, (5-), (10-)%-level. Error terms are clustered on the municipal level.
30
Table A.5: PBCs in public expenditure: First stage regression of Table 3
Dependent variable: Dummy = 1 if the incumbent runs for re-election
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instrument 1: Dummy mayor is pensionable -0.196∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗ -0.260∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗
[-15.249] [-15.016] [-14.993] [-14.976] [-17.160] [-17.086]
Instrument 2: Dummy mayor is older than 60 years -0.358∗∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗ -0.421∗∗∗ -0.393∗∗∗
[-26.568] [-26.258] [-26.243] [-26.240] [-25.577] [-22.991]
Council elections
Pre-election year 0.011 0.021∗∗ 0.001 0.029∗∗∗ -0.014
[1.113] [2.064] [0.114] [3.319] [-0.963]
Election year 0.001 0.034∗∗∗ -0.006 0.043∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗
[0.103] [3.851] [-0.509] [5.554] [-2.121]
Post-election year 0.015∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ -0.001 0.064∗∗∗ -0.004
[2.030] [4.189] [-0.122] [6.973] [-0.429]
Mayor elections
Pre-election year 0.006 -0.000 -0.011 -0.020∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗
[1.213] [-0.076] [-1.626] [-3.821] [-5.839]
Election year -0.054∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗
[-8.369] [-8.696] [-9.124] [-9.824] [-10.386]
Post-election year -0.042∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗ -0.416∗∗∗ -0.585∗∗∗
[-4.617] [-5.129] [-5.916] [-32.439] [-25.287]
Mayor elections × council elections
Joint pre-election year 0.031∗ 0.067∗∗∗
[1.788] [3.136]
Joint election year 0.092∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
[4.825] [7.017]
Joint post-election year 0.101∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗
[4.378] [10.770]
Mayor elections × instrument 1
Pre-election year 0.022∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗
[2.917] [6.168]
Election year 0.039∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
[3.603] [7.258]
Post-election year 0.480∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗
[26.536] [25.584]
Mayor elections × instrument 2
Pre-election year 0.016∗ -0.076∗∗∗
[1.912] [-3.157]
Election year -0.020 -0.216∗∗∗
[-1.544] [-7.094]
Post-election year 0.465∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗
[23.333] [15.409]
Council elections × instrument 1
Pre-election year 0.086∗∗∗
[5.415]
Election year 0.090∗∗∗
[6.103]
Post-election year 0.081∗∗∗
[5.886]
Council elections × instrument 2
Pre-election year -0.102∗∗∗
[-3.958]
Election year -0.152∗∗∗
[-6.230]
Post-election year -0.148∗∗∗
[-6.689]
Joint elections × instrument 1
Pre-election years -0.182∗∗∗
[-5.700]
Election years -0.256∗∗∗
[-7.422]
Post-election years -0.375∗∗∗
[-12.668]
Joint elections × instrument 2
Pre-election years 0.215∗∗∗
[4.644]
Election years 0.385∗∗∗
[8.401]
Post-election years 0.136∗∗∗
[4.330]
Control variables X X X X X X
Observations 39363 39363 39363 39363 39363 39363
R2 0.220 0.222 0.222 0.223 0.335 0.343
Notes: All specifications include municipality and time fixed effects. Robust t-values are shown in brackets. ***, (**), (*) denotes sig-
nificance at the 1-, (5-), (10-)%-level. Error terms are clustered on the municipal level. The estimation includes the full set of additional
control variables. Source: Own calculations.
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